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THE MANY FACES OF DARLENE JESPERSEN
MICHAEL SELMI*

I. INTRODUCTION
Darlene Jespersen worked as a bartender at the Harrah’s Casino in the
hardscrabble town of Reno, Nevada. Unlike its glitzier cousin Las Vegas, Reno is
anything but glitzy, with a deteriorating downtown that is thirty years past its
prime. Jespersen began her career at Harrah’s—now the largest casino chain in
the world—as a bar back, fetching ice and cutting lemons, and was quickly
promoted to bartender. Twenty years later she remained a bartender in the
Sports bar, creating the kind of long-term career that is all too rare these days.
But the career Jespersen formed came to a halt when Harrah’s demanded
that she wear makeup. Jespersen was required to wear makeup at work, in
addition to her uniform, as a part of a company initiative; but she refused to do
so. Jespersen never wore makeup in or out of the workplace—she felt extremely
uncomfortable doing so and also felt it was unnecessary to her job. In her own
words:
I had to become a sex object. And it was only because I am a woman . . . . The
men who worked by my side did not have to conceal their faces. Harrah’s
considers them professional when they look like themselves. Although it had
nothing to do with mixing drinks and handling customers, keeping my job
became more and more about meeting Harrah’s extreme and outdated idea of
1
what a woman should look like.

When Jespersen held her ground, she was fired. So she sued Harrah’s alleging
that the company’s makeup constituted gender discrimination in violation of
2
Title VII.
These rather straightforward facts demonstrate why this case has garnered
so much attention. Here was a dedicated and, by all accounts, outstanding
employee standing up for principle against a large corporate employer that
imposed what appeared to be an unnecessary and—at least to Jespersen—
demeaning policy. Jespersen sued without the help of a union because this
particular casino was non-unionized, and she refused to budge. She refused to
allow her job to turn her into something she did not want to be.
* Visiting Professor of Law, Boston University Law School, Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School.
1. Darlene Jespersen, Op-Ed., Case Is About Civil Rights and Sex Bias, RENO GAZETTE-J., Feb. 5,
2004, at 11A.
2. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). The
case is thoroughly discussed in Devon Carbado et al., The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work,
in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
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However, the law was not on her side, a fact she likely realized early on. As
discussed in detail shortly, the two legal theories that Jespersen advanced failed
to offer any meaningful protection. Courts have long permitted differential
grooming codes for men and women so long as the codes do not impose an
“undue burden” on one gender, and Harrah’s code arguably treated men and
women the same despite having different requirements for each. Had she
desired, Jespersen almost certainly could have developed this argument in more
detail, but this was the least interesting aspect of her case and one that, if
successful, would not have made a major social impact.
The more far-reaching theory involved the developing law of sexual
stereotyping, and here is where Jespersen staked her claim. Jespersen argued
that the company’s make-up requirement was premised on impermissible
sexual stereotypes, effectively requiring her to meet a sexual stereotype of what
a woman should look like. This claim, too, failed her, and given the context of
the existing legal framework compared to the potential breadth of Jespersen’s
claim, I will suggest that it should have failed. Although most slippery slopes
are not as slippery as they appear, this one actually was.
That is the legal face of the Jespersen case, but there are other, and in some
ways, more important aspects of the claim, as well. The Jespersen case raises
fundamental and difficult questions about the way in which one’s identity is
expressed or created in the workplace, the self we bring to work. At bottom,
Jespersen’s claim might be seen as a search for what Kenji Yoshino defines as
3
authenticity, a desire to be true to one’s self in and out of the workplace. But the
workplace is not traditionally a place for authenticity: It is a place of uniforms
and conformity, a place where we go to be someone else, to perform for
someone else, and a legally protectible claim to authenticity threatens to unravel
the existing workplace structure.
A related subtext, one that has mostly been skirted in prior discussions of
the case, involves the question of sexual orientation, namely whether Darlene
Jespersen was a lesbian. One newspaper report of the case included the
4
headline, “Lesbian Loses Dress Code Discrimination Suit,” even though there is
nothing in the record to suggest that Jespersen was a lesbian. The Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund—the premier civil rights litigation group for gay
men and lesbians—represented Jespersen throughout most of the litigation,
which in and of itself is certainly not evidence that she was gay: Lambda Legal
may have taken the case because of the importance of the sexual stereotyping
theory to its constituency, given that, to date, the theory has prospered primarily
in cases involving gay or transgendered individuals.
Since this symposium and this case are about appearances, it is worth
noting that Lambda Legal posted pictures of Darlene Jespersen in her uniform
on its website, and those pictures could be seen as presenting a stereotypical

3. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). I
discuss Yoshino’s argument in Part III, infra.
4. Ann Rostow, Lesbian Loses Dress Code Discrimination Suit, DALLAS VOICE (online ed.), Apr.
20, 2006, available at http://www.dallasvoice.com/artman/exec/view.cgi/18/1892 (last visited Nov.
7, 2006).
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5

image of a middle-aged gay woman. There are obviously many reasons the
pictures may have been presented—to humanize her, to show the effect of the
makeup policy since the pictures appeared to be taken in the context of the
personal best policy—but they also convey an image, and were likely intended
to do so. As I will discuss further below, the pictures may provide some insight
into the complexities of appearance and identity, and also indicate why we
might want to pause before we stake a claim to authenticity within the
workplace. When it comes to our identities, there is no escaping social norms,
6
for we can only be authentic within the selves that society provides. That, of
course, does not mean that our identities are entirely socially determined, or that
we cannot embrace the identities we are provided. Yet, it does mean that the
quest for authenticity is always a limited one, and if it is a limited one, why
would makeup provide the drawing line? How should we draw the line
between who we are and who others want us to be? A better approach to issues
of identity in the workplace might be to conceive of our work selves as separate
from our authentic selves, acknowledging that at work, we all perform and act
out of character. This leaves our identity to be more fully developed outside of
work, and raises the more fundamental question: how much of ourselves do we
bring to work, or should we expect to bring to work?
In this essay, I will explore the various aspects of the case, the legal, the less
legal, and their intersection. I also want to stress that even though I believe the
case was correctly decided, I also believe this is precisely the kind of case that
needs to be brought even when the prospect of winning is low. Jules Lobel has
written eloquently about cases where a losing outcome was all but certain and
7
yet the victory was in the fight. I think that Darlene Jespersen personifies that
very phenomenon. She did what she should have done: She stood up for
principle and never wavered. This is a law professor’s dream case in so many
ways, but it is also much more than that, because it forces us to confront
fundamental and difficult questions about identity and the workplace, about
what the workplace ought to be, and, relatedly, about who we are at work.
II. THE LEGAL STORY
The facts of the Jespersen case are rather straightforward. Darlene
Jespersen had worked as a bartender for Harrah’s casino in Reno, Nevada for
more than twenty years when the company imposed a new dress code in most
of the company’s casinos. The company had always maintained dress codes, but
the new policy, dubbed “Personal Best,” was far more extensive and confining.
5. Lambda Legal originally posted three pictures of Ms. Jespersen on its website. Two pictures
show her in her uniform. (These pictures are no longer available on the Lambda Legal website, but
they can be found at http://www.nevadalabor.com/barbwire/barb00/barb10-8-00.html. (last
visited Jan. 8, 2007)).
Another picture, which appears less stereotypical, is of Ms. Jespersen out of her uniform. The
pictures are discussed further in Part III, infra. See also Lambda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org/
cgi-bin/iowa/cases/record?record=191 (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
6. For a recent excellent overview of meanings of authenticity and identity given the
constraints we face, see KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005).
7. See JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO
JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003).
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Relevant to the case, the policy required women to wear makeup, and it also
required the employees to meet with an image consultant to determine the
appropriate application of the makeup. Jespersen refused to comply with the
8
requirements because she found the policy revolting and demoralizing. When
she refused to abide by the policy, she was offered the opportunity to find
another job within the company that would not involve customer contact. When
she was unable to find something, she was fired, and there was no question that
she was fired for her refusal to wear makeup.
Two other factors contributed to Jespersen’s legal claim. As part of the
company policy, men were forbidden to wear makeup and they had to keep
their hair trimmed. Less relevant to the legal case (but in some ways more
significant), the company also required its employees to wear uniforms, and
Jespersen’s uniform was—somewhat ironically—very male in appearance. She
wore a white shirt with a black vest and pants, a dour outfit that seemed to clash
with the makeup requirement. Jespersen, however, never objected to wearing
the uniform, and certainly one of the questions lurking in the background of her
claim was how the makeup requirement differed from the uniform, a question
that I will return to shortly and one that is not so readily answered. Two legal
theories, one interesting and one less so, were at the core of Jespersen’s legal
challenge, and I will take them up in turn.
A. The Unequal Burdens Test
Jespersen alleged that the company’s policy discriminated against women
by imposing an unequal burden on them. Of the two core theories, this one was
decidedly less interesting because the law in this area was already well settled
9
and the remedy quite limited. Since the 1970s, courts have permitted employers
to require different uniforms for men and women, so long as those uniforms do
10
not impose an unequal burden on one sex or the other. That burden might be in
8. As part of the consultation, the company took pictures of the employees, including of
Darlene Jespersen, and those pictures were kept so that they would be available for a daily
comparison. See Darlene Gavron Stevens, Casino Gives Workers Look They Can, Must Live With:
Harrah’s Insists they Maintain Appearance Provided in Makeover, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 2000, at C1
(describing personal best policy).
9. Although the case law is reasonably settled, a vast and interesting literature has developed
to explore the various issues raised by the cases. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear
Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2541 (1994); Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1395 (1992); Kimberly A, Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against
Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167 (2004). Two recent articles focus on the Jespersen case and its
implications. See David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240
(2004); Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation
as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006).
10. There were a series of cases in the 1970s, all of which permitted differential dress codes. See,
e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding prohibition on
long hair for men); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977) (permitting requirement
that men wear ties); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec., 764 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding sexspecific dress codes). Challenges to sex-specific dress codes continue to arise and the results tend to
be identical. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding
employer policy requiring men to have short hair); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254
(N.D. Ind. 1998) (upholding employer policy requiring men to have short hair). Courts have
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the form of differential costs, or even the time that was required to comply with
the policy; it might also arise if women were required to wear an excessively
11
suggestive outfit. The latter issue was not implicated in this case, and there was
no claim that the company was sexing up Jespersen in order to increase her
business, a claim that would otherwise be consistent with the history of
12
bartending. Once employers opened the bartending doors to women, they
realized that women could be used to induce men to enter those doors and
drink by having women bartenders wear sexually suggestive outfits or flirt. It is
quite likely that such a motive lay behind Harrah’s policy, but it did not seem
relevant in Jespersen’s case, in part because, by all accounts, she had been an
extremely successful bartender during her twenty-year career without the
assistance of makeup.
In this instance, Jespersen’s undue burden claim turned on whether the
13
policy required more of female than it did of male employees. It probably did,
as the dissenting opinion of the en banc court pointed out, but Jespersen failed
to develop a record on this point, a fact that doomed her claim in the eyes of the
14
majority. As a litigation strategy, failing to develop the record was quite
sensible. By the time the case was in litigation, Jespersen was no longer
interested in regaining her job—Harrah’s had offered to reinstate her and to
exempt her from the makeup requirement—she was determined to invalidate
the policy altogether. If she had prevailed on the unequal burdens argument, the
policy may very well have stayed in place, with the company perhaps supplying
the makeup to reduce the cost burden on women. The company might also have
reacted by increasing the burdens on the male employees, perhaps by requiring
them to shave daily, put gel in their hair, or something along those lines.
Similarly, prevailing on the undue burdens test would not have advanced the
law; rather, this would have been an application of a limited but well15
established legal principle. Consequently, as the case progressed, the unequal

invalidated differential policies when women have been required to wear a uniform while men were
permitted to wear business attire. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
11. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding employer’s
uniform violated Title VII because it subjected women to sexual harassment).
12. See generally Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and
the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13 (2007).
13. Within the Ninth Circuit, the undue burdens test has been developed in the context of
several airline cases where women were typically required to meet a different weight standard than
men. See Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (invalidating policy that
imposed weight restriction on female but not male flight attendants); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,
216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (invalidating policy that required women to meet weight requirements
for medium frame while men were permitted to satisfy large body frame standard). Various airline
policies designed to regulate the appearance of their flight attendants have generated a substantial
amount of litigation, and many of the cases are discussed in Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc. See Gerdom,
692 F.2d. at 606–08.
14. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kozinski conceded that Jespersen had failed to develop the
record adequately on the burdens of the makeup requirement, but he urged the court to take judicial
notice of the time and cost necessary to comply with the company’s policy. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
15. Many commentators have advocated changing the existing law so that appearance codes
would be significantly more difficult to justify. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 9 (advocating that
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burdens argument became primarily a sideshow for the far more important
claim based on sex-stereotyping.
As an aside, and relevant to the subsequent stereotyping claim, it is worth
noting that when the grooming cases first arose, they were not easy cases. The
EEOC and some courts held that differential grooming standards violated Title
VII, and the claims from men who wanted to wear their hair long appeared to be
straightforward claims of sex discrimination that often included claims of
stereotyping. In the leading case, Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Company, the plaintiff argued that requiring men to have short hair played on
16
impermissible stereotypes, “since short hair is stereotypically male.” In order to
resolve that claim, the Fifth Circuit convened an en banc court, plumbed the
depths of legislative history, disregarded the EEOC’s interpretation and
ultimately decided that Congress was not concerned about mutable conditions
when it prohibited discrimination based on sex, drawing a dissent from the
17
court’s most esteemed members. Yet, once the decision was in place, there was
no looking back: All of the other circuits quickly piled on, and the underlying
theory has not been seriously revisited since that time.
B. The Sex-Stereotyping Claim
Darlene Jespersen’s primary claim relied on an emerging theory of sexstereotyping, one that has been developed most extensively in the Ninth Circuit
18
where Jespersen’s lawsuit arose. Jespersen claimed that, by requiring her to
wear makeup, Harrah’s was requiring her to fit a stereotype of what a woman
should look like, and by firing her, Harrah’s was penalizing her for her refusal
to comply with the sexual stereotype.
1. The Developing Law of Sexual Stereotyping
This theory has been one of the most interesting developments in
employment discrimination law in the last two decades, and it had a curious
start. The sexual stereotyping theory is traced to the well-known case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which Ann Hopkins challenged her employer’s
19
decision not to admit her to the partnership. A central reason she was not
admitted to the partnership was that she failed to fit the stereotype of a woman,
at least in some respects. Hopkins was brash, opinionated, and in the way the
case was presented, she acted more like a man than a woman. Yet, she claimed,

appearance codes should be analyzed as an invasion of privacy). As framed, however, Jespersen was
not seeking to change the law, only to fit her claim within it.
16. 507 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1975). This claim was premised on the Supreme Court’s
discussion of the “sex-plus” theory in which an employer discriminated against women with preage children, rather than all women, a claim the Court held fell within Title VII’s prohibition. See
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
17. See Willingham, 507 F.2d. at 1093 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Judge Wisdom’s dissent was
joined by Judges Tuttle, Goldberg, and Godbold.
18. Some relevant cases are: Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio),
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); and Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
19. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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had she been a man, her behavior would have not only been acceptable but
required. Still, although Price Waterhouse is usually cited as the origin of the
sexual-stereotyping theory, and it is one of the few cases in which the Supreme
20
Court has discussed the concept of stereotyping, the central issue was not that
she failed to meet a stereotype but that she was being treated differently because
she was a woman. In other words, Ann Hopkins was not treated differently
because she acted out of stereotype: Had she appeared to the partners to be a
stereotypical woman, perhaps by acting more demurely, she almost certainly
would still have been denied a partnership. In the words of Justice Brennan, the
author of the plurality opinion: “An employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable
and impermissible catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a
21
job if they do not.” From this perspective, her claim presented a minor twist on
an otherwise ordinary disparate treatment claim: Her behavior was judged
differently because she was a woman.
The sexual stereotyping claim alluded to in Hopkins lay dormant for most of
22
the next decade, and came to life in the context of a same-sex harassment claim.
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court unanimously
held that claims of same-sex sexual harassment were cognizable under Title
23
VII. The facts in Oncale lent themselves to the kind of sexual stereotyping
suggested in Price Waterhouse. Oncale worked as part of an all-male team on an
offshore oil rigger. He alleged that he was harassed because he was effeminate
and therefore, in the eyes of the other male employees, failed to meet the image
of what a man should be like. Oncale strenuously denied that he was gay; thus,
the harassment did not appear to target his sexual orientation, although it may
24
have occurred due to the perception among his co-workers that he was gay.
Nevertheless, he claimed that the other men picked on him because he did not
fit their stereotype of a man.

20. See id. at 251 (“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group . . . .”) (plurality opinion). The lower court also admitted testimony from
Dr. Susan Fiske discussing sex stereotyping. Id. at 235–36.
21. Id. at 251 (plurality opinion).
22. There were a few cases that sought to develop a claim along the lines established in Hopkins,
but most of those were unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355 (7th Cir.
1991) (rejecting a sex-stereotyping claim premised on family-oriented questions asked of female
applicant). While the case law was relatively quiet, scholars demonstrated an active interest in the
theory. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation
of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93–98 (1995) (discussing Price Waterhouse and stereotyping
theory in context of broader theory of equality); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion
of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1990) (discussing Price Waterhouse and
appearance cases).
23. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
24. In his Supreme Court brief, Oncale wrote:
Can there be any treatment more demeaning and objectively harassing to a married,
heterosexual male with two children than to be subjected to sexual taunts, sexual touching
and physical, sexual assault by other men with whom he must work in a closely confined
work space on the Outer Continental Shelf of the United States?
Brief of Petitioner at 27–28, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568).
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Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale, the lower courts had
developed a bizarre array of tests to determine when a claim of same-sex sexual
harassment could be pursued under Title VII. In some circuits, it was important
that the plaintiff not be gay, in others the alleged harasser had to be gay, and in
25
some jurisdictions, the plaintiff had to be gay. It was this doctrinal mess—
which arose because Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation—that the Supreme Court sought to clarify when it held that samesex sexual harassment was cognizable under Title VII. While in that respect the
decision was both short and straightforward, it sparked a new interest in the
sex-stereotyping theory, even though that was not how Oncale’s claim was
framed. In combination with Price Waterhouse, a series of cases have arisen
challenging employer decisions to compel workers to fit a certain gender
stereotype. The cases are still relatively few in number but the majority of
successful cases have involved the harassment of gay or transgendered
individuals, claims that were not at issue in either Price Waterhouse or Oncale.
Perhaps the best example of the gender stereotyping case is found in
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., where a waiter at the restaurant
alleged that the other workers harassed him because he did not fit a male
26
stereotype. As described by the Court of Appeals:
Sanchez was subjected to a relentless campaign of insults, name-calling, and
vulgarities. Male co-workers and a supervisor repeatedly referred to Sanchez in
Spanish and English as ‘she’ and ‘her.’ Male co-workers mocked Sanchez for
walking and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman,’ and taunted him in
Spanish and English as, among other things, a ‘faggot’ and a ‘fucking female
27
whore.’

Borrowing from Oncale and Price Waterhouse, the court held that Sanchez had
stated a claim premised on a theory of sexual stereotyping in that he was being
“discriminated against for acting too feminine,” noting further that the abuse
28
“reflected a belief that Sanchez did not act as a man should act.”
Although Nichols involved some homophobic taunts, the opinion does not
discuss or disclose Sanchez’s sexual orientation, and in this respect, the case
might be seen as a simple application of Oncale with the important exception

25. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) (no
claim existed where the harasser and the harassed were heterosexual); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
Am., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment claim existed where the harasser was
homosexual); Yeary v. Goodwill Indus., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997) (sexual harassment claim existed
where the harasser was homosexual); Miller v. Vista, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (no
same-sex sexual harassment permitted because plaintiff was heterosexual).
26. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
27. Id. at 870. The court also noted that the comments “were not stray or isolated.” Id.
28. Id. at 874. The court added:
Sanchez was attacked for walking and carrying his tray ‘like a woman’—i.e., for having
feminine mannerisms. Sanchez was derided for not having sexual intercourse with a
waitress who was his friend. Sanchez’s male co-workers and one of his supervisors
repeatedly reminded Sanchez that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes,
referring to him as ‘she’ and ‘her.’ And, the most vulgar name-calling directed at Sanchez
was cast in female terms.
Id.
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that the court emphasized the sexual stereotyping theory which was implicit,
29
rather than explicit, in Oncale. A more complicated case recently arose in Rene
v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., where an openly gay butler for a casino complained of
30
harassment from his co-workers, all of whom were male. The harassment
endured in Rene was strikingly similar to that involved in Nichols and Oncale,
with more sexual overtones. The case was more complicated, however, because
during his deposition Rene repeatedly stated that he was harassed because he
31
was gay rather than because of any particular stereotype.
The case produced five separate opinions, with three substantive ones
covering the range of perspectives that have emerged in similar contexts. The
majority opinion focused on the language of Title VII requiring that the
offensive behavior be “because of sex,” and since much of the behavior was
sexual in nature, though not obviously motivated by sexual desire, the court
treated the case as little more than an adaptation of the same-sex harassment
cause of action authorized in Oncale. The majority opinion also added that
Rene’s sexual orientation was irrelevant to the legal inquiry, noting that in the
many cases involving women who were harassed in similar fashion courts had
32
not “denied relief because the victim was, or might have been, a lesbian.” “The
sexual orientation of the victim was,” the court continued, “simply irrelevant. If
sexual orientation is irrelevant for a female victim, we see no reason why it is
33
not also irrelevant for a male victim.” Hard to argue with that logic, one might
be tempted to say, except for the stubborn fact that Title VII does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation. As the dissent stressed, if Rene was
being harassed because he was gay, a long-standing view of Title VII would
34
deny him any relief.
That is likely why Judge Pregerson’s concurrence relied on a sexstereotyping analysis that, in some ways, offered a more limiting theory, while
in other ways provided a more expansive analysis. The concurring judges
turned to Price Waterhouse to conclude that Rene was being harassed not just
because he was gay but rather because his sexual orientation placed him outside
of the norm for male behavior. In a footnote the court explained:
There would be no reason for Rene’s co-workers to whistle at Rene ‘like a
woman,’ unless they perceived him to be not enough like a man and too much

29. It is worth noting that the concurring opinion in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., stressing the
applicability of Nichols’ gender stereotyping theory, twice states that Sanchez was gay. See 305 F.3d
1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Pregerson, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 1061 (plurality).
31. The dissenting opinion counted nine different statements during Rene’s deposition that he
stated that the harassment was due to his sexual orientation. See id. at 1077–78 (Hug, J., dissenting).
Neither the majority nor the concurring opinion denied this characterization of the record, and the
majority explicitly noted that, “When asked what he believed was the motivation behind this
harassing behavior, Rene responded that the behavior occurred because he is gay.” Id. at 1064
(majority opinion).
32. Id. at 1066.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1074–75 (Hug, J., dissenting).
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like a woman. That is gender stereotyping, and that is what Rene meant when
35
he said he was discriminated against because he was openly gay.

Because the record was relatively undeveloped, the concurring opinion is short
and under-theorized. As the dissent emphasized, the logic of the concurring
opinion might enable any claim of harassment of gay men to fit into the
stereotyping theory, particularly since Rene emphasized that he was a
36
“masculine male,” rather than a more effeminate man like Oncale. If so, the
stereotyping theory could lead to offering protection for claims based on sexual
orientation, in contravention of the statutory language. That may be what the
concurrence intended, but it is clear a slippery slope is ahead, and it is a slope
even progressives may not want to go down. One reasonable inference from the
concurring opinion is that gay men simply do not fit the norm of what it means
to be a man. While such a conclusion may provide legal protection in some
circumstances, it also may compound the existing stereotypes of gay men and
lesbians as individuals who fall outside the mainstream. Maybe that is a
necessary first step toward garnering antidiscrimination protection, and maybe
37
some legal protection is better than none, but that may not be so clear, as will
be discussed further below.
A recent trio of cases from the more conservative Sixth Circuit has also
explored the boundaries of the sexual stereotyping theory. In Smith v. City of
Salem, the plaintiff was a transsexual who was undergoing treatment for Gender
Identity Disorder and in the process was expressing a more feminine
38
appearance. Smith was a lieutenant in the fire department, and when he
disclosed his condition to his superiors, they quickly plotted to drive him out of
the department. His case was originally dismissed by the district court under the
notion that transsexuals were not protected by Title VII, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed that determination. Applying a sexual stereotyping theory, the court
found that Smith had stated a claim due to his “failure to conform to sex
39
stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave.” The court went
on to elaborate a broader rationale for its determination explaining that:

35.
36.

Id. at 1069 n.2 (Pregerson, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1077 (Hug, J., dissenting). The full passage from the dissent is:

Rene made no claim of sexual stereotyping and there was virtually no evidentiary basis
upon which Rene could have supported such a claim had it been made. In fact, at one
point in his deposition in referring to another worker who had harassed him, he stated,
‘He’s skinny. He is not masculine like I am.’
Id. (footnote omitted). Obviously, one could contest the meaning of that sentence, but it also suggests
that he was not effeminate in the way emphasized in Oncale.
37. At this point in time, it is a misnomer to say there are no protections against employment
discrimination for gay men and lesbians. Although Title VII does not protect against discrimination
based on sexual orientation, and efforts to extend the law have so far failed, many states and
localities do prohibit such discrimination, including states where large numbers of gays and lesbians
live. See SEAN CAHILL, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE FOUND., THE GLASS NEARLY HALF FULL:
47% OF POPULATION LIVES IN JURISDICTION WITH SEXUAL ORIENTATION NONDISCRIMINATION LAW 1
(2005), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/glasshalffull.pdf.
38. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
39. Id. at 572.
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After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women because,
for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex
discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s
sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against men because they do
wear dresses or makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex
40
discrimination.

Because almost by definition a transsexual is failing to live up to a gender
stereotype, one implication of the court’s analysis is that transsexuals would
41
always be protected under Title VII. And the next case suggested as much.
In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the plaintiff, who was a pre-operative
transsexual, worked for the Cincinnati police department for nearly twenty
42
years and was seeking a promotion to sergeant. Having passed the written
examination, Barnes was then subject to a probationary period during which he
was criticized for not being masculine enough, and members of the police force
followed him to investigate his off-work behavior. The court noted that, “Barnes
was living off-duty as a woman, had a French manicure, had arched eyebrows
43
and came to work with makeup or lipstick on his face on some occasions.”
Barnes was denied his promotion and filed suit under Title VII. In a sign that at
least in some respects things have changed, he was awarded more than $575,000
plus attorney’s fees by a Cincinnati jury, the same city that just a decade earlier
had hosted the battle over the propriety of Robert Mapplethorpe’s art. That
decision was upheld on appeal in a matter-of-fact determination that simply
applied the court’s earlier holding in Salem to affirm the verdict based on the
sexual stereotyping theory. On this point, there was virtually no discussion or
analysis.
The court, however, quickly cut back on this expansive interpretation, and
it is now possible that within the Sixth Circuit only transsexuals are protected
under the sex stereotyping theory. The court recently explored the implications
of its prior cases in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center, where a security officer
alleged that he was being harassed because he was perceived to be gay due to
44
his friendship with a gay doctor. Vickers set forth his allegations in a seventyone page complaint but the court quickly sought to cabin the stereotyping
theory by noting that “recognition of Vickers’ claim would have the effect of de
facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual orientation as a prohibited basis
45
for discrimination.” Sounding much like the dissent in Rene, the court
explained that allowing Vickers’ claim would effectively mean that “[i]n all
likelihood, any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable
under a sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all
40. Id. at 574.
41. At one point the court states, “[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and
therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from discrimination
directed at Ann Hopkins.” Id. at 575. In the course of its decision, the court did distinguish an earlier
series of cases that had denied protection to transsexuals because those cases had arisen before Price
Waterhouse. See id. at 573–74.
42. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).
43. Id. at 734.
44. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
45. Id. at 764.
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homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their
46
sexual practices.” That would only be true, one might respond, if we define
one’s identity through sexual practices, yet, that leaves unexplored how such a
definition differs from the one at issue in Rene where, as noted earlier, the
concurring opinion suggested that all gay men fall outside of the reigning social
norm, independent of their actual sexual practices but not independent of their
47
sexual orientation. This was, in fact, the approach taken by the dissenting judge
in Vickers who stressed that the evidence indicated that Vickers’ was harassed
48
because he was perceived as “not masculine enough” for the other workers.
One final case is worth mentioning, in part because it provides perhaps the
closest analogy for Darlene Jespersen and demonstrates some of the problems
that might arise as a result of an expansive approach to the sexual stereotyping
theory. Dawn Dawson was a lesbian who, after she was fired, sued the hair
49
salon where she had worked. There was a substantial dispute in the case about
why Dawson was fired, but she sought to fit her case within a gender
stereotyping claim. Her case was complicated by the fact that many of the
employees at the salon were gay, and the owner was “a pre-surgery male-to50
female transsexual.” Yet, Dawson argued that she was harassed because of her
butch appearance; while conceding that non-conformity was permitted at the
salon, she argued that only a certain kind of non-conformity was tolerated. In
other words, though she did not make this claim explicitly, it sounded like she
51
was claiming that she was the wrong kind of lesbian. The court had little
trouble finding that Dawson’s claim fell outside the boundaries of the sexual
stereotyping theory as she was not required to change her behavior, nor had she
pinpointed any adverse actions that had been taken because of her appearance.
Dawson, the court noted, was allowed to wear her hair in a Mohawk style, and a
52
number of the other female stylists had very short hair.
The above discussion demonstrates the fundamental incoherence of the
law—a law that, in its complexity, only law professors could admire. When a
case turns on the language one uses to answer a deposition question, or on the
53
specific language that is used as part of the harassing behavior, or when the
law relies on stereotypes to establish a violation of a stereotyping theory, it is
only a matter of time before the edifice is likely to crumble. If one were looking
for a silver lining, it might be that the cases could, in an indirect way, encourage
individuals to be open about their sexual orientation. But in the way the cases

46. Id. at 764.
47. Applying these distinctions recalls the older cases in which the Ninth Circuit battled over
the status versus conduct definition in the well-known case involving Perry Watkins. See Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
48. Id. at 768 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
49. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005).
50. Id. at 214.
51. During her deposition she was asked, “Is it fair to state that another thing you’re
complaining about in this action is that you were discriminated against because you’re a lesbian who
looks a certain way?” And her answer was, “Yes.” Id. at 217.
52. Id. at 222.
53. For example, a harassment claim based on “you are gay” might not be cognizable, whereas,
by adding one word, e.g., “you are so gay,” it might be.
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are developing, there remains a fine line between encouraging someone to be
openly gay and requiring them to be stereotypically gay. The cases have also
restored the confusion Oncale was intended to eliminate, as courts are again
evaluating the plaintiff’s sexual orientation, as well as the identities of the
harassers, to determine whether a claim is cognizable. It would be so much
easier if the law was simply extended to provide protection against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
2. Darlene Jespersen’s Stereotyping Claim
Jespersen’s case arose at the fringes of the stereotyping theory. Her sexual
orientation was never at issue in the case; rather, she claimed that Harrah’s was
requiring her to conform to a stereotype about how women ought to appear, an
issue that might have satisfied the court in Smith v. Salem but that was dismissed
in the Dawson case. At the same time, because the focus was on her appearance,
Jespersen’s case more closely resembles the much older case involving
54
newscaster Christine Craft, who was fired for not having the right look.
Christine Craft was a newscaster whose employer sought to alter her
appearance as a way of boosting her viewer ratings. Despite extensive makeup
and wardrobe makeovers, her ratings failed to improve sufficiently. Craft was
then reassigned to a reporters’ position and later departed for a different station,
after which she filed a claim for sex discrimination and fraud against her former
employer. Many of the facts implicated in the Craft case parallel those in
Jespersen with two important differences. One difference was that it was not at
all clear that Christine Craft could satisfy the station’s appearance requirements
given that the efforts to dress her up failed to improve her ratings as a television
anchor. By contrast, Jespersen could have had the right look by putting on
makeup. From a legal perspective, Jespersen’s claim then becomes more like one
of the many mutable conditions cases, something akin to speaking English or
changing her hairstyle, where courts have typically held that so long as the
55
employee could satisfy the requirement there is no statutory violation.
A more important distinction between the cases lies in the fact that
Christine Craft was a television anchor, and there is little question that
appearance matters for those who appear on television. Indeed, both the district
and appellate courts acknowledged that the appearance of the newscasters went
to the company’s bottom-line, and social norms embraced appearance as
relevant for television personalities. No one would suggest that a television
anchor, or even a reporter, should be able to wear whatever she wants on the
air, and we fully expect that those who appear on television will be made up.
From this perspective, one might be tempted to distinguish the Craft case by
noting that she was a television newscaster while Jespersen was a bartender.

54. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
55. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding policy requiring
workers to speak English because they could readily comply). To avoid any misunderstanding, I
believe the doctrine that has developed on English-only cases is wrongheaded and that most such
policies ought to be invalidated either based on actual animus or at a minimum under a disparate
impact approach. Nevertheless, courts have consistently declined to extend protections to mutable
conditions.
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Yet, not only is there no newscaster exception in Title VII, even if there were an
exception for jobs in which appearance mattered, Jespersen’s bartender position
might very well fall within that exception. One might then be tempted to
conclude that the court was wrong in Craft, and as a factual matter, it appeared
56
that Craft’s employer was overly obsessed with appearance. Yet, seeking to
establish a line between excessive and appropriate obsession with appearance
would draw courts into arbitrating an unwieldy boundary, and it is highly
unlikely that a court would voluntarily accept such a role absent a more
compelling social norm that appearance should not matter.
This raises an additional question regarding the interrelationship of the
workplace and social norms. We often want the workplace to be better than
society, and sometimes it is. As Cindy Estlund has noted, workplaces are
frequently our most diverse institutions, certainly more diverse than most of our
57
neighborhoods. Nonetheless, whatever diversity or racial harmony one might
find in the workplace is principally a reflection of broader social norms of
equality: Equality based on race, sex, religion, and national origin is now a wellestablished national aspiration even though we frequently fail to live up to that
aspiration. Discrimination based on appearance is not and never has been.
Perhaps it would be a better world if we did not make judgments based on
appearance but, as Robert Post has observed, it is difficult to know what that
58
world would be like. Absent a physical screen to block appearances, it is hard
to imagine that we would not make some judgments based on personal
appearance, just as it is hard to imagine we would not make aesthetic judgments
of art work, buildings, movies, or other things that we observe. The argument
might be that not all judgments should be prohibited—appearance might be
relevant to the extent that it is important to job performance. But appearance is
never intrinsically relevant to performance. The only reason we consider
appearance relevant is because we judge people based on their appearance. In
other words, it is our obsession with appearance that makes appearance
relevant, rather than anything that has to do with job performance. If we sought
to limit, or eradicate such judgments, then appearance would never be relevant:
We would not have any beauty pageants, and even something like a strip club
could presumably no longer choose its employees based on their appearance.
We might choose newscasters solely based on their ability to read or possibly on
their voice, although it is not clear why judgments based on one’s voice would
be preferred to those based on appearance. Alternatively, if we are to allow
some appearance requirements, then we must decide when appearance is
relevant and who should be allowed to make that determination.
This is not to suggest that employers should always be free to make
employment decisions based on appearance, but it does suggest that we
56. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215 (“While we believe the record shows an overemphasis by [the station]
on appearance, we are not the proper forum in which to debate the relationship between
newsgathering and dissemination and considerations of appearance and presentation . . . .”
(alteration added)).
57. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN
A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003).
58. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (2000).
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recognize that these workplace judgments are a reflection of our broader
obsession with appearance and attractiveness. Until stronger social norms
develop, we should not expect courts to pave the path of resistance. It is also
worth noting that judgments based on appearance do not always favor those
who fit the classical definitions of beauty—attractive women often have
59
difficulty being taken seriously. Judgments based on appearance run deep and
in many directions.
To be sure, courts have made some inroads in altering industry norms
regarding appearance requirements, particularly in the many cases involving
the airlines. At the time Title VII became law most airlines would only hire
attractive young women as flight attendants, presumably because their male
60
customers preferred attractive women. Various permutations also prohibited
pregnant or married women to work as flight attendants, and when courts
struck down those overtly exclusionary policies, the airlines began to impose
61
weight restrictions. Although they proved surprisingly resilient to challenge,
the weight limits were ultimately defeated, and today it is not uncommon to
find flight attendants of various ages, genders, weight, and appearance. The
airline cases, however, have proved of limited precedential value in challenging
dress codes. The airline cases were all grounded in overt exclusionary policies
and the subsequent practices, such as the weight restrictions, were pretextual in
nature, similar to the many voting rights cases from an earlier era where state
officials implemented one scheme after another to evade their constitutional
62
duties. Importantly, none of the airline cases involved challenges to uniform or
63
grooming policies or relied on a sexual stereotyping theory. Instead they
sought to alter the sex-stereotyped job classification through traditional claims

59. Last year, Harvard University was sued by one of its library staff who argued that she had
been denied promotions because she was too attractive and did not fit the University’s image of a
manager. See Shelley Murphy, Jury Finds No Bias By Harvard: Librarian Loses Race, Gender Case,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2005, at B2 (“Harvard University did not discriminate against a black
assistant librarian who alleged that she was repeatedly bypassed for promotion and was told she
was just a ‘pretty girl’ who dressed too sexy to get ahead . . . .”).
60. Probably the best known of the airline cases is Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp.
292 (N.D. Tex. 1981), a case in which the airlines sought to justify its exclusion of male flight
attendants with a study showing that its male passengers preferred female flight attendants. See also
Diaz v. Pan Am. Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (invalidating policy of hiring women
only).
61. See, e.g,, Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (invalidating weight
restrictions on female flight attendants); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000)
(invalidating weight policy that allowed men a more generous standard than women).
62. In what are collectively known as the white primary cases, the Supreme Court struck down
a series of efforts designed to evade constitutional mandates that included transferring power to
private parties. While there were some theoretical difficulties involving the state action issue in the
cases, the Supreme Court had little difficulty invalidating the various efforts that had the undeniable
intent to deny African Americans their constitutional right to vote. The cases are Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927), Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1955).
63. In 1991, there was, however, an administrative claim filed to challenge Continental Airlines’
requirement that its female workers wear makeup. The airline abandoned its policy without
litigation. See Elizabeth A. Brown, Many Women Still Battle Grooming Discrimination, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 10, 1991, at 1 (discussing case of Teresa Fischette who “refused to wear the makeup
required by the new appearance handbook at Continental Airlines.”).
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of disparate treatment, including both whether gender could satisfy the
stringent bona fide occupational requirement when men were precluded from
serving as flight attendants and why the airlines instituted different weight
guidelines for men and women. We might seek to extend these claims to the
casino industry—and many claims have been filed challenging various aspects
64
of dress policies for cocktail waitresses —but casinos seem different from
airlines, just as television anchors seem different from flight attendants.
Even if Jespersen were to fit within the emerging stereotyping theory, those
cases raise a number of difficult theoretical issues. As noted previously, the
stereotyping cases tread a fine line between protecting individuals because of
their sexual orientation and because they fail to fit into a certain stereotype of
what or who men or women ought to be. But the cases are problematic in a
different way, one highlighted by Judge Posner in a recent case. The idea that
gay men do not fit the stereotype of a man itself plays on a pervasive stereotype
of what a gay man looks and acts like. Stereotypes thus appear necessary to
succeed under the stereotyping theory, which might be understandable given
the lack of protection federal law offers for gay men and lesbians, but it ought to
65
be deeply problematic as well.
The real problem, however, is not just that Jespersen’s case was hard to fit
within the stereotyping theory, but rather that her case presented a particularly
problematic slippery slope. If employers cannot require makeup, can they
require uniforms? Is there any meaningful difference between Jespersen’s
tuxedo and the makeup requirement as it relates to her authentic identity?
Within the context of the casino industry, the next most obvious case would
involve the cocktail waitresses who traditionally wear revealing clothes
presumably in the hope they might induce men to stay a little longer at the
tables and slot machines. And one need not focus on sexy clothes: Is it possible
64. Workers at the Sands Casino filed suit challenging some of the dress requirements for the
cocktail waitresses, including wearing high heels. The case was settled so that the female servers
were given the option of wearing lower shoes and pants. See Stevens, supra note 8 (discussing Sands
lawsuit).
65. Though Judge Posner, in his inimitable style, overstates and seems unconcerned with the
offense that might be taken from his language, his argument seems sound. He begins by noting that
“the case law has gone off the tracks in the matter of ‘sex stereotyping’” and then proceeds to
explain why. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.,
concurring). He writes that, under existing law, or the way in which the law is developing:
[T]he absurd conclusion follows that the law protects effeminate men from employment
discrimination, but only if they are (or are believed to be) heterosexuals. To impute such a
distinction to the authors of Title VII is to indulge in a most extravagant legal fiction. It is
also to saddle the courts with the making of distinctions that are beyond the practical
capacity of the litigation process. Hostility to effeminate men and to homosexual men, or
to masculine women and to lesbians, will often be indistinguishable as a practical matter,
especially the former. . . . To suppose courts capable of disentangling the motives for
disliking the nonstereotypical man or woman is a fantasy. . . .
Inevitably a case such as this impels the employer to try to prove that the plaintiff is a
homosexual . . . and the plaintiff to prove that he is a heterosexual, thus turning a Title VII
case into an inquiry into an individuals’ sexual preference . . . . An unattractive byproduct
of the inquiry is a gratuitous disparagement of homosexuals, as when Hamm in his brief,
remark[s] how “his harassers tormented him with the ultimate attack on his masculinity
[by] barraging him with every vulgar, slang phrase for a homosexual” . . . .
Id. at 1067 (alterations added).

15__SELMI.DOC

2/8/2007 2:09 PM

THE MANY FACES OF DARLENE JESPERSEN

483

to distinguish any uniform from a makeup requirement? What about sexspecific jewelry requirements, where women may wear earrings but men may
not? Surely not all of these issues could lead to federal complaints under Title
VII, and many simply rehash old arguments relating to sex-differentiated
clothing or hairstyles that, as discussed previously, contemporary courts have
66
had little trouble dismissing.
When I say surely, I do not mean as a normative matter. I can imagine a
legal system designed to protect one’s identity or one’s expressive self in the
workplace (and I will discuss whether that would be desirable in the next
section). What I mean to suggest here is that, absent an explicit directive, it is
fanciful to expect that a court would protect those expressive elements because
such protections would seriously encroach upon the formidable employment-atwill rule. One of the basic, if implicit, assumptions behind the employment-atwill principle is that employers have a right to have their employees appear as
the employer deems appropriate for the workplace, subject to some limitations.
It is not possible for employers to always cater to customer desires, for example,
as is well established in the context of race discrimination. It is even
impermissible for most employers to hire only women or men because the
customers might prefer having one gender performing a particular job. This was
67
true in the old airline cases involving stewardesses, and it has been true in the
more recent cases involving Home Depot and Wal-Mart, and even within the
68
securities industry. But those cases involved outright exclusions rather than
appearance requirements, and courts have been far more hesitant to encroach on
that employer prerogative, again so long as the employer stays within
established antidiscrimination boundaries.
There is also a theoretical difficulty at the heart of the appearance claims:
What if an employer requires its workers to act out of stereotype, perhaps as an
act designed to disrupt or destabilize those stereotypes? What if the employer
required its male employees to wear dresses while forbidding their female
employees from doing so as a way of disturbing the existing stereotypes? Could
an employer impose a neutral requirement so that all of its employees dressed
69
alike regardless of gender? This example is not so far-fetched. In the case
breaking down the gender exclusion at the Citadel, a central issue was whether
Shannon Faulkner could be made to have a buzz haircut just like the male

66. See supra notes 16–17.
67. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (invalidating policy of
hiring women only); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (same).
68. Although none of the class action cases concerning Home Depot, Wal-Mart or the various
brokerage firms involve issues of customer preference, those issues were present below the surface,
particularly for Home Depot which traditionally had not allowed women to work on the sales floor,
in part it appears because of a perception that customers would not want to take advice from
women. I have discussed these cases in detail in Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties,
Seventies Style: Case Studies in The Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y
J. 1 (2005).
69. The Milwaukee Medical Examiner’s office required all of its employees to wear ties after
men complained that requiring them to wear ties, but not their female counterparts, was
discriminatory. The policy was disbanded during arbitration. See Jim Stingl, Nectkie Policy for
Examiners the Focus of Hearing Today, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, April 5, 2000, at 3B.
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70

cadets. Faulkner, along with the United States, objected because such a haircut
would have the effect of stripping her of her gender with a likely intent, and
71
certainly effect, to demean her presence in the school. Taking these issues one
step further, what if an employer required its employees to conform to a
stereotype that did not necessarily have negative implications and might, in
some respects, be seen as empowering. What if, instead of prohibiting a cornrow
hairstyle, American Airlines decided to require all of its African-American
72
female employees to wear their hair in a cornrow style? Would it make a
difference if it required all of its female employees to do so? What about the
employer that demands authenticity from its employees so that it will only hire
those who are true to themselves and therefore bans hair dye, perfume, and
plastic surgery? Or consider the employer that prohibits makeup at work?
There are potential answers to these puzzles, and perhaps the most
common response would be that no employer would impose most of these
requirements so they are not worth discussing. However, that is an answer we
would not accept from our students, and it is not one that we should be satisfied
with as academics either, in part because these scenarios are ones courts must
consider when seeking to rationalize their decisions. The real problem with
these appearance issues is determining how to draw the line, by knowing how
to conceive of acceptable appearance codes and by identifying those that ought
to run afoul of antidiscrimination mandates. For those who find appearance
codes problematic in all dimensions, the easiest solution would be to ban all
such codes so that employees would be free to dress how they desired, leaving
them to express their true selves in the workplace. Yet, even with an explicit ban
on all codes, there would have to be some limits: Presumably even the most
ardent opponent of appearance codes would accept a requirement that an
employee wear clothes of some sort. And from there the slope becomes slippery:
Clean clothes? Clothes that are not too revealing? If so, then how would “too
revealing” be defined, and more importantly who should get to make that
judgment? Once we begin to ask these questions, we are again heading down a
road that courts are understandably reluctant to travel.
Another likely response to the idea of something like mandatory cornrows
is that employees should be free to choose their own styles, to choose how they
want to express their heritage, or whatever else it is they might want to express.
I believe that this emphasis on autonomy underlies much of the criticism of
appearance codes. Yet, this idea of self-autonomy runs counter to the constraints
of the workplace, where most employees enjoy only limited freedom.
Employees are typically not free to choose when to arrive or when to leave, or

70. The issue of Shannon Faulkner and the Citadel’s effort to make her have the same buzz
haircut as the male cadets is thoroughly discussed in Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as
Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV.167, 199–201 (2004).
71. Id. at 200. In her discussion of the case, Professor Yuracko relies on an article by Faulkner’s
attorney Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions,
17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68 (2002), which quotes Faulkner’s attorney as arguing that Faulkner
would be “a gender outlaw—neither male nor female. Doubtless many male cadets would label her
a “dyke,” a butch lesbian whose sexual desire for women makes her not a “real woman.” Id. at 71.
72. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding company’s no-braid
policy against race discrimination challenge).
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what to do at work and how to do it, which is where the difficulty arises in
trying to determine why mandatory cornrows might be impermissible. It would
be equally problematic to focus only on negative stereotypes because that would
require courts to police stereotyping—such as with makeup—based on broad
social norms, and it is certainly not clear why we would expect courts to rise up
to challenge those stereotypes when society embraces them. If we were serious
about defeating such negative stereotypes, it would seem that we would want to
prohibit the use of makeup altogether, otherwise, it is not so much about the
negative stereotype but simply about employee autonomy.
Lurking in the background of the entire discussion is the question of
uniforms. To many, uniforms are a sign of conformance and employer control,
but uniforms also serve important purposes and can be a source of employee
pride. One issue that shines through in Katherine Newman’s eloquent
exploration of low-wage jobs is the pride that many of the workers took in
73
wearing their Burger Barn uniforms. Employers often require uniforms as a
manner of branding. One prominent example is United Parcel Service (“UPS”),
for which the drab brown uniforms worn by men and women alike are an
important part of the company’s identity and have created something of a cult
74
following. Perhaps most importantly, from a social perspective, uniforms
provide some level of safety, particularly when access to the uniforms is limited
and they provide a means of identifying employees. Meter-readers typically
wear a uniform for this reason, as do postal workers and others who might have
access to one’s home; uniforms can also play a role in creating a relationship of
trust between the employee and the customer. Surely we would not want to ban
all uniforms, and uniforms are most effective when they are, well, uniform.
That is why this particular slippery slope actually feels slippery, and why it
is difficult to stretch the stereotyping theory to reach appearance codes.
Appearance codes can surely be discriminatory, as was the case with
Abercrombie & Fitch and other retailers who sought a particular look among
75
their youthful employees, a look that tended to exclude minority youth. But the
stereotyping theory is not needed to strike down those sorts of discriminatory
policies, and it is unlikely that the theory can be ably stretched to tinker with the
codes and, as discussed in the next section, it may be that we do not want the
theory to stretch quite so far.

73. See KATHARINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER City
(1999). Burger Barn was the fictional name Newman gave the fast-food establishment that formed
the heart of her book. See also Kathy Nelson & John Bowen, The Effect of Employer Uniforms on
Employee Satisfaction, 41 CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q. 86 (2000) (documenting the
effects uniforms can have on employee morale and satisfaction).
74. For a discussion of the importance of UPS’ uniforms to its brand, see Marla Dickerson, Part
of the Package: UPS’ Drivers’ Image Could Work to Unions Advantage, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, at D1.
75. The clothing company, Abercrombie & Fitch, agreed to pay $40 million to settle a claim that
it discriminated against minority applicants in its hiring practices by consigning minority employees
to non-visible positions. See Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie & Fitch Bias Case is Settled, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2004, at A16. Similar cases have been brought against other retailers. See, e.g., Cruz v. Coach
Stores, 202 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000) (dismissing Latina plaintiff’s claim challenging the “Coach look”—
described as “white and blond”—because plaintiff did not show that she would have been promoted
but-for not having the “Coach look”).
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III. BEYOND THE LAW
The last section suggested that the law is generally incapable, or unwilling,
to make the fine distinctions necessary to determine the propriety of most
appearance codes. In this section, I will address a different issue, one that poses
the normative question of whether the law should make those distinctions,
whether it is desirable, or necessary, that we allow individuals to challenge
appearance standards because they threaten one’s identity or authenticity.
Appearance codes like those instituted by Harrah’s might also broadly
inconsistent with what is often labeled the expressive workplace—a place where
individuals are allowed some level of expressive activity, whether in the form of
speech or one’s identity as expressed through their appearance. These issues
touch on the equally fundamental questions of what we expect from the
workplace, and relatedly, who we are at work. Indeed, I think the real question
underlying Jespersen’s claim is who we are, or should be, at work. Should
dressing up at work be seen as a threat to one’s identity, or might it be better to
think of ourselves as someone else when we are at work, or that our work selves
are just one part of being? This leads to a question I have been pursuing in other
works, namely how much of ourselves should we expect to bring to the
76
workplace, and how much we should expect from work?
In his recent work, Professor Kenji Yoshino sees the workplace as a place
77
where we ought to be able to pursue, or express, our authentic selves. Professor
Vicki Schultz and others have argued that the workplace is where we find
78
ourselves, where our selves are created, at least in part, based on our work. In
her more recent work, Schultz has also suggested the workplace can be a place
of sexual expression and she has cautioned that the evolution of sexual
79
harassment law may be going too far to rid the workplace of its sexuality.
Professor Cindy Estlund, in turn, sees the workplace as one where democratic
values can flourish. Based on the empirical observation that our workplaces are
frequently our most diverse experiences, she wants to create structures to allow
space for those democratic values, to allow workers a voice or interactions that
80
they might not find elsewhere. As the suggestive title of a recent book notes,
81
from this perspective, it is not just work.
While disparate in their foci, all of these theories share a common vision of
the workplace as serving functions that extend well beyond work. And to a
certain extent that is undeniably true, but only to an extent. To be sure, we
cannot divide ourselves into work and non-work selves, nor can we divide our
lives neatly into work and non-work segments, as there will always be an
intersection. But that does not mean the workplace should become a forum for
identity, authenticity, democracy, or sex. It might mean that these issues will

76. See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class, Public Work and Private Lives, 66 LA. L. REV.
1035 (2006); Workplace Justice: Finding a Balance in a World Without Unions (working manuscript
on file with author).
77. Yoshino, supra note 3.
78. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
79. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).
80. See Estlund, supra note 57.
81. See RUSSELL MUIRHEAD, JUST WORK (2004).
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always be present in the workplace but they need not be dominant, and to the
extent we make them dominant, there may be the unintended consequence of
enhancing the importance of the workplace in a way that might suppress our
demands for justice within. If we expect too much from the workplace, if we
expect it to be a place where we find our authentic selves, our friends, or our
vocation, we might actually find ourselves asking too little of that workplace for
fear that we might lose it. We may, in fact, make more demands the less
important work is to our lives, the less emphasis we place on work, and the
more emphasis we place on our lives outside the workplace.
This does not mean that work should just be work, or that employees
become the employer’s property until the bell or whistle sounds at the end of
the day. Many people do find their life’s work in the workplace, and when that
happens, it is surely to be celebrated rather than condemned. Indeed, I would
suggest that, in an ideal world, this consummation of interests should be our
aspiration. The problem, of course is that we do not live in that ideal world—
well, when I say we, I mean a global “we” because we academics generally do.
For academics, work really is more than just work. It is often what we live for, it
is where we find our identity, and it is where we find our life’s work. As much
as any profession, academics understand the joys and fulfillment of meaningful
work.
But that is certainly not true for most people and likely never will be.
Although this fact may seem too obvious to mention, it is also too easy to forget
as we consider what workers expect or deserve from the workplace. For most
workers, work is a place to earn a living, to make friends perhaps, but more
importantly, to earn money that allows them to enjoy the other parts of their
lives. And many people are happy to be someone else while at work. Even our
metaphors about work suggest that we are someone different while at work.
When one comes home from work, he or she typically “changes,” and although
it would be foolish to place much emphasis on this particular phrase, it
nevertheless conveys the important idea that there is a separation between our
home and work lives. At work, we perform, we act, and we wear uniforms that
are not of our choosing.
Even among academics, uniforms are the rule. Among male law professors,
there are some who wear suits to convey authority, to look like a lawyer used to
82
look or perhaps simply because others wear suits. There are those who want to
look hip and will dress down, or up, depending on what hip means to that
person. There will also be those who want to appear like they just put on
whatever clothes were close at hand without spending any significant time on
the choice, and perhaps they did just that, but chances are they did so to appear
like one who does not care about clothes. The restraints on women can be
different but they are no more circular, as inevitably we seek to convey an image
in how we appear, and it is not a freely chosen image. For example, none of
those who wear suits to command respect or convey authority can actually think

82. There are also probably some older Professors who wear suits because they have them from
their days as a lawyer. I have heard some Professors say that they wear suits to look like a lawyer,
which only suggests that they have not been inside a law firm in ten years since suits are no longer
the norm in many workplaces.
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the suit does anything other than play on the images the students may have.
They might just like wearing a suit and the reduced choices that come in
matching a coat and pants, yet the reason one likes to wear a suit has to do with
a look or appearance, at least for most people. It might just be easier if we all
wore robes.
With the possible exception of a robe, academics would surely object if they
were required to dress in a particular way. However, it is not because of an
especially strong desire to exercise our autonomy or express our authenticity, it
is because of our status. Other than judges, high-status individuals are not
typically required to wear costumes, and I suspect Chief Judge Schroeder, the
author of the Jespersen en banc opinion, would strenuously object if she were
ordered to wear makeup or to appear more (or less) feminine. Even though
Justice O’Connor donned ruffles while on the Supreme Court bench, she would
presumably have objected if she had been required to wear them, or if she and
83
Justice Ginsburg had been ordered to wear different colored robes. But, as
Catherine Fisk has recently explained, that is primarily a matter of status and
84
power rather than about the reach of the law.
And that is ultimately the point at issue in Jespersen. The real issue was not
that she was being required to be someone she was not, to be dolled up with
85
makeup, to look like a clown as she claimed, but that she did not have the
power and the status to fight the employer’s dress code. No one would tell a
judge to wear makeup or establish a formal dress code for professors because of
their status and power. But there is little restraint when it comes to low-level,
low-prestige jobs. Changing that dynamic, giving workers more power, would
surely be a better solution than turning to antidiscrimination law for help,
particularly since, the law is likely to turn its back on such claims. Collective
action can help restore some of the imbalance of power workers now experience,
and if there had been a union in place at the Harrah’s casino in Reno, or if more
of the servers had objected to the policy, the litigation may have been
unnecessary. Nevertheless, Jespersen’s act of resistance proved effective, as
86
Harrah’s later abandoned its Personal Best policy. The important point here is
to emphasize that ultimately it is not about the makeup, or the desire to be
oneself at work—rather, it is about the current imbalance of power that allows
employers to impose many oppressive conditions that individual employees are
left largely powerless to confront. The law might be able to remedy some of the
extreme deficiencies on a limited ad hoc basis but we ought to be careful how

83. Requiring judges to wear different robes based on their gender may be designed to
undermine the authority of the female judges, particularly if their chosen color was pink, which
might be seen as less strong or authoritative. But what if the female judges wore the black robes
while men wore blue, or green?
84. Fisk, supra note 9.
85. See Rhina Guidos, Fashion Checklist: No Blush, No Lipstick . . . No Job, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 18, 2001, at 1 (“I was good enough to do my job for 18 years,” says the bartender
[Jespersen]. “Suddenly, I wasn’t good enough to do my job because I refused to look like a clown.”
(alteration added)).
86. Bob Egelko, Court Oks Sex-Based Grooming Standards, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15, 2006, at B1
(“Harrah’s says it no longer enforces the makeup requirement and at one point offered to rehire
Jespersen without makeup . . . .”).
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we choose to utilize the law, and it may be that we would be better off thinking
of the workplace as a place for work, rather than as a place for expressive
activities or a place to pursue our authenticity. When we ask too much of law—
as the appearance cases generally do—we are almost certain to be disappointed,
and Title VII is not likely to be a sharp weapon in the battle to rectify the glaring
imbalance of power that currently defines the workplace.
There is another reason why we should pause before we begin to treat the
workplace as a forum for authentic identity, and this returns me to the
contentious question I raised at the outset regarding Darlene Jespersen’s sexual
orientation and the lingering question of whether she was a lesbian. The obvious
temptation when this issue is raised is to suggest it is either irrelevant or
perhaps unduly invasive. But, in the context of the case, that is not at all clear.
An important rationale for challenging the makeup requirement is that it was
inconsistent with Darlene Jespersen’s own self-image, as it interfered with her
quest for authenticity. Yet, her sexual orientation could be relevant to that quest,
as presumably one’s authentic self would not be hidden from public view, so
there would be no desire to cover one’s sexual orientation, even if there might
still be a need. If the workplace becomes a place to express our identity, it may
not be long before employers or other employees might demand authenticity or
begin to peer into private lives by blurring the distinction between work and
home life. Maybe the emphasis is really on her autonomy, the desire to control
87
her public image or how the public perceives her. While such a goal is
understandable, we do not typically have the luxury of controlling how the
world sees us or how we are judged. Even if we did have that luxury, it would
have little to do with one’s authentic self, but instead it would involve the self
we desire to reveal, a claim that is as noted, fundamentally inconsistent with the
idea of a workplace where personal autonomy is restrained. Rather than a focus
on authenticity, it might be that what is really at issue is that Darlene Jespersen
considers her sexual orientation irrelevant to her work self, that it is neither
relevant to her work nor of relevant concern to her customers, coworkers and
employees. On this point, I fully agree and do not believe she should feel
compelled to discuss or disclose her sexual orientation if she chooses not to, but
this conclusion must then concede that we do have, and often want, a separate
work self.
An objection to this line of reasoning is likely to emphasize that the only
reason many individuals conceal their sexual orientation is because of
discriminatory social attitudes towards gay men and lesbians. This is a theme
that Kenji Yoshino emphasizes, and the social pressures that result are obviously
real and tragic in so many ways. This is not the place to have an extended
discussion regarding the various pressures to cover, but it is to say that Title VII
is not likely to ease the pressures or burdens of covering. What is needed along
these lines is explicit protection against discrimination for gays and lesbians, as

87. Autonomy is central to Jeffrey Rosen’s concept of privacy, namely an ability to control how
the world sees us. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA (2001). This is also central to Professor Yoshino’s work: “My real commitment is to
autonomy—giving individuals the freedom to elaborate their authentic selves—rather than to a rigid
notion of what constitutes an authentic gay identity.” Id. at 93.
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well as further erosion of the social barriers to acceptance. The idea that gays
and lesbians cannot talk about their partners and lovers and cannot put up
pictures of them at work is wrong, but the stereotyping cases may not alleviate
that harm. Indeed, they could compound it, particularly if the cases continue to
distinguish between discrimination based on sexual orientation and
discrimination based on refusing to meet the stereotypical image of a man or a
woman. This is an issue for which, as a society, there remains a need for
substantial change and progress, but we also want to be careful that individuals
are not compelled to either reveal or hide their sexual orientation.
IV. CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the outset, Lambda Legal posted pictures of Darlene
Jespersen on its website, and there were three such pictures. Two were of
Jespersen in her uniform and while it is difficult to tell from the pictures
whether she is wearing any makeup, in both she looks like a bartender, someone
at work. The third picture is of Jespersen out of her uniform, out of work, as she
sits comfortably on a rock probably in the desert outside of Reno. She could be
anyone or anything, and there is little question that the contrast portrayed by
this third picture is far stronger than is present in the two uniform pictures. This
third picture is a picture of strength and courage, a picture of a woman who
stood up for principle, never wavered, and ultimately improved the working
conditions of others. And it is ultimately this picture that we should see, the
authentic Darlene Jespersen as revealed by her actions, the self that ultimately
matters most.

